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statute law of the mother country, and, strange to say, entails were
greatly favored. Notably in Virginia, the statute De donis was in
full force, and in the year 1710, lands were protected from being
barred by fine and common recovery, the legal fiction resorted to in
England. Even slaves were rendered capable of being entailed by
an Act of the local legislature passed in 1727. In 1734, however, small estates, not exceeding 200. in value, were authorized to
be barred by a proceeding termed ad quod damnum. Estates above
that value could only be barred by an Act of the Assembly. "I
believe," says Judge HENRY ST. GEORGE TUcKER, "when this was
done, a settlement of other lands equivalent in value was always
required.", Commentaries of the Laws of Virginia, book ii., c.6.
In Pennsylvania, as early as 1799, a statute was passed giving
the tenant in tail in possession the power to bar the entail by a
deed of bargain and sale, without recourse to the process of fine or
recovery which had previously existed as part of the common law
of the state.
In the state of New York, the fiction of Fines and Common
Recovery, was abolished by statute: see 2 R. S. 243, § 24. Up
to that time such a resort must have been still in use for barring
entails of lands of inheritance.
In fact the practical effect of settlement and limitations of future
and contingent interests in property of every description is much
the same in both countries, public sentiment in Great Britain favoring the law of primogeniture and entail in the abstract, but offering
facilities to those who desire to escape it. The same public sentiment in the United States favors an equal distribution, and an
open market for land in the abstract, but affords all reasonable
facilities to those who, having acquired property, desire to dispose
of it in a way most congenial to themselves.
HUGH WEIGHTMANT.
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Court of C-ancery of New Jersey.
TODD v. RAFFERTY'S ADMINISTRATOR.
Profits made secretly by one of two partners, in the business of the firm, are
partnership property.
The Statute of Limitations applies to actions of account between partners.
Where the accounts between partners have been closed for six years, and there
has been acquiescence for that period, without fraud, the statute constitutes a bar;
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but the statute affords no defence in a case where there have been dealings within
six years.
The statute does not begin to run against each item of an account between partners, from the time it becomes a part of the account ; but if part be within six years,
it draws that which is before after it.
When the court assumes jurisdiction on the ground of fraud, the statute only
begins to run from the discovery of the fraud.
A court of equity will not sit as the divider of gains which are the proceeds of
crimes or frauds involving moral turpitude. And profit by an agent to buy, who
is also secretly the seller, is the product of a fraud within this rule.

ON final hearing on bill, answer and proofs.
This was a suit by a surviving partner, against the administrators of his deceased copartner, for an account. In January
1859, Todd and Rafferty formed a copartnership, to carry on'the
business of manufacturing and selling machinery, and also for the
purpose of doing a general commission and agency business for the
purchase and sale of machinery and machinists' and railroad supplies. This relation continued until March 1872. They then
discontinued business, and transferred a part of their assets to a
corporation known by the name of the Todd & Rafferty Manufacturing Company. No formal dissolution was ever agreed upon,
and it was admitted that the partners never finally settled or
adjusted their affairs. The works at which their machinery was
made were located at Paterson, and this part of the business was
managed by Todd; they also had an office and store in the city of
New York, where their sales were principally made, and the mercantile part of their business conducted. Rafferty had charge of
this part of the business. A separate set of books was kept at
each place. Rafferty died in July 1872, and the bill in this case
was filed March 28th 1876, after an unsuccessful effort had been
made to settle the matters in dispute by arbitration.
Socrates Tuttle, for complainant.
William Pennington and A. B. Woodruff, for defendants.
VAN FLEET, V. 0.-The bill exhibits but a single ground of
complaint, viz., that Mr. Rafferty, during the existence of the partnership, carried on a part of its business secretly, without entering
it upon the books of the firm, and appropriated the profits-to his own
use. The sum thus withdrawn, it is said, exceeds $30,000. The
proofs- in demonstration of this charge are complete. The private
books of Mr. Rafferty, in which this business was entered, are in
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evidence. They show that, up until within about three years of the
discontinuance, he carried on a very considerable business, precisely
like that carried on by the firm, and took the profits to himself. The
evidence, in my estimation, renders it equally certain that such
business was carried on clandestinely. A partner, having equal
rights and powers, and pursuing business for profit, would never
willingly consent that so valuable a part of the joint business should
be diverted by his associate to his own benefit. In the absence of
an express stipulation to the contrary, .the parties to a contract of
copartnership always understand, from the very nature of the
relation, that all gains made by either in the prosecution of the
common business, shall be joint property. Generally, a copartnership is a combination of the capital, skill, industry and influence
of two or more persons for the prosecution of a particular business
for their mutual benefit, and a claim by one that he has a right to
carry on a part of the joint business for his own advantage, and to
the manifest injury of his associates, is so utterly destructive of
the rights and duties legally incident to the relation, that it will
never be sanctioned by a court until it is clearly shown that he
holds such right by the assent of his associates. It is certain that
the existence of such right should not be inferred from slight circumstances, and that is all there is to support it in this case. I
consider the fact clearly established, that Mr. Rafferty carried on
clandestinely, a part of the business which he and the complainant
had associated themselves together to prosecute for their joint
benefit, and, consequently, I deem it to be entirely beyond dispute
that the complainant is entitled to an account of such business, and
to be awarded a share of its profits, unless some other sufficient
defence has been shown.
But the defendants insist that the complainant's right of action
is barred by lapse of time, and they have invoked the protection
of the Statute of :Limitations by their answer. It will be remembered that the business of the partnership was discontinued in
March 1872, but no final settlement was then had, nor had been
previously made, and that this suit was commenced March 28th
1876. The business carried on by Mr. Rafferty, in fraud of the
complainant, ceased in January 1869. More than six years
elapsed between the cessation and the commencement of this suit.
This is the delay on which the defence rests.
The statute undoubtedly embraces actions of account, either at
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law or in equity, between partners: Cowart v. _Perrine, 3 C. E.
Green. 457. And where the accounts have been closed for six years,
and there has been acquiescence for that period, unexplained by
circumstances and not countervailed by an acknowledgment, the
statute constitutes an insuperable bar: Barber v. Barber, 18
Yes. 286 ; Tatam v. Williams, 8 Hare 857; Story on Part.,
§ 233, n. 4; Coll. on Part., § 374. But the statute has no
application to a case where there have been dealings within six
years, where assets have been converted into money, or assets have
been applied in discharge of partnership liabilities within that
period, and no settlement has ever been made. And in such a
case the statute does not begin to run against each item from the
time it becomes a part of the account, but if a part of the account
be within six years, that part of it draws after it the items before
six years, so as to protect them from the statute : Stout v. sSeabrook's
.x'rs, 3 Stew. 187 ; Coster v. Murray, 5 Johns. Ch. 530 ; Miller
v. Miller, Law Rep. 8 Eq. 499; Atwater v. Fowler, 1 Edw. Oh.
423. In the case last mentioned, the court said, until the business
of winding up the affairs of the partnership is in such a situation
that an account can be stated, and its affairs finally closed, the
partner asking relief is not in laches in not demanding an account.
Applying these rules to the facts of the case in hand, it is perfectly
obvious the statute does not 4fford even the shadow of a defence.
But even if the partnership dealings appearing upon the books
of the firm had been fully settled and closed for more than six years
prior to the bringing of this suit, still the defence of the statute would

be unavailing to the defendants, for the rule is well established in
equity, that where the complainant's action is grounded on a fraud,
which the defendant has concealed until sufficient time has run to
enable him to set up the statute, the statutory period will not be
considered to have commenced until the fraud is discovered, or
would have been discovered had reasonable diligence been exercised:
Angell on Lim., § 183; Story's Eq. Jur., §§ 1521, 1521 a;
ifoveden v. Lord Annesley, 2 Sch. & Lef. 634; Headerv. Norton,
11 Wall. 458. Vice-Chancellor WIGRAM, in Blair v. Bromley, 5
Hare 541, said, where the court assumes jurisdiction on the ground
of fraud, the statute only begins to run from the discovery of the
fraud; and this doctrine was reiterated by Lord COTTENHAM when
the case came before him on appeal: 2 Phil. Ch. 354. In Brooksbank v. Smith, 2 You. & Coll. (Exch. Eq.) 60, Baron ALDERSON
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said, courts of equity adopt the Statute of Limitations to assist their
discretion. In cases of fraud, however, they hold that the statute
runs only from discovery, because the plaintiff's laches does not
commence until he is acquainted with the circumstances. Chief
Justice PARKER held, in Parnamv. Brooks, 9 Pick. 244, that,
even at common law, fraud, if not discovered until within six years
before action brought, was a good answer to the statute ; but this
view is unquestionably opposed to the general current of judicial
opinion: Troup v. Smith, 20 Johns.. 46; Allen v. Miller, 17
Wend. 204; Smith v. Bishop, 9 Vt. 110; Tee v. Fee, 10 Ohio
469 : Olarke v. Marriott,9 Gill 331. But it will be found these
cases uniformly concede that it is an established doctrine of equity
jurisprudence, that a defendant will not be permitted to avail himself of the statute, when it appears he has, by fraud, prevented the
complainant from coming to a knowledge of his rights. In my
opinion, it is not possible to take any view of this case which will
make the Statute of Limitations a bar to the complainant's action.
It is admitted that part of the gains made by Mr. Rafferty, in
the business he carried on secretly, were obtained by the practice
of fraud. Instances are shown where acting as the agent of a
purchaser, he would purchase at one price and sell to his principal
at a price considerably larger, thus becoming both seller and purchaser, and getting both commissions and a profit. The complainant claims a share of the gains thus fraudulently made, and he
grounds his right on a series of cases which hold that, when an
illegal or fraudulent transaction has been completed, and the money
earned by it, being due to two or more persons, has been received
by one or a third person for the wrongdoers, an action will lie in
favor of any one of the wrongdoers for his share. It is claimed
for this doctrine, that it does not violate that salutary principle of
juridical ethics which declares that a court will never lend its aid
in the enforcement of a contract founded in immorality or illegality,
for, it is said, in such cases the illegal transaction being fully completed, the court, in compelling the wrongdoers to divide, does not
enforce the original contract between the parties, but proceeds upon
an implied promise arising from the reception of the money, and
that such implied promise is so entirely distinct from the original
arrangement as to be, in legal estimation, free from its taint. This
view, substantially, has been adopted in the following cases: Paikney
v. Reynous, 4 Burr. 2069; Petrie v. Hennay, 3 T. R. 418;
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Tenant v. Elliott, 1 Bos. & Pul. 3; Farmer v. Russell, Id. 296;
Nash v. Ash, 1 Eden 379; Watts v. Brooks, 3 Yes. 612; Sharp
v. Taylor, 2 Phil. Ch. 801; MeBlair v. -iWbbes, 17 How. 232;
Brooks v. Adams, 2 Wall. 70; Woodworth v. Bennett, 4 Hand
273; Merritt v. Millard, 4 Keyes 208.
But this doctrine has been repudiated with considerable sternness,
in this state, by this court and also by the Supreme Court. In
Watson v. Murray, 8 C. E. Green 357, one of several partners
brought his bill for the dissolution of a copartnership engaged in
carrying on the lottery business, and asking, also, for the sale of
its property and a distribution of its assets. Although it did not
distinctly appear by the pleadings (the case was heard on demurrer)
where the business had been carried on, in order to put the case in
the best possible shape for the complainant, it was assumed it had
been carried on in states where such business was lawful. ViceChancellor DODD held that the action could not be maintained,
characterizing it as an attempt to use the power of the court to
apportion among criminals the gains resulting from their crimes.
The lottery business, by our law, is a misdemeanor, and any gains
resulting from its prosecution, whether carried on here or elsewhere,
must, in our tribunals, be regarded as the spoils of crime:
The case presented to the Supreme Court was less offensive in
its moral features. It was an action to recover part of the proceeds
of a transaction simply illegal, not criminal. The plaintiff and
defendant were doing business separately as loan brokers. They
nad an arrangement by which they were to assist each other, and
under which, if the plaintiff sent a customer to the defendant for
whom he procured a loan, he was to be entitled to half the commissions received by the defendant. It was understood that the
commissions to be charged were to be in excess of the rate allowed
by law. Chief Justice BEASLEY, in stating the reasons why he
could not assent to the rule which would constrain a court to sit as
the divider of such gains, said: "Until the money, which is the
wages of the ill-doing, has come into the hands of the several
delinquents, the illegal transaction, so far as they are concerned, is
not closed, and unless the matter has been entirely concluded by
such adjudications that it would be but captiousness to dissent from
them, it might well be worth consideration, whether it would not be
more consistent with the usual course of the law, and more protective of public interest, to proclaim the outlawry of such affairs
VOL. XXVIL-61
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from the first step to the last. If A. and B. make sale of forged
papers, and the proceeds are paid by the purchaser to A., a court
of law can scarcely be said to perform either a very respectable or
useful function when it assists B. in obtaining his share of the
profits of the business. Nor would it seem that it should give
much concern to those who dispense public justice, if one of two
such delinquents should be successful in fraudulently witholding
from his companion a share of the wages of iniquity. Under such
conditions, the assistance of the law might, it would seem, be rightfully refused, not for the sake of the party who thus cheated his
associate in guilt, but in order to render such affairs as precarious
and difficult as possible to those who might be inclined to enter
upon them :" Gregory v. Wilson, 7 Vroom 320. These adjudications, in my judgment, definitely settle the principle which must
be applied in declaring the rights of the parties to this suit.
Itis true, the gains sought'to be recovered in the cases just
referred to, resulted from ventures carried on in defiance of positive
statutory prohibitions, but the rule which declares that an agent,
authorized to buy, shall not himself become the vendor, and that
any profit secretly made by him,.in violation of this rule, is the
fruit of fraud, has all the force a legal rule can have. It is rooted
in justice and sound policy, and stands prominent among those
cardinal principles of justice which have received the approval of
the general judgment of mankind as being indispensable to the
promotion of honesty and fair dealing. In my estimation, there is
little ground for comparison, on the score of the moral quality of
the acts, between an open demand and acceptance of illegal brokerage and the secret betrayal of confidence. The first is simply an
open violation of law, while the latter adds to the wrong of the
first, secret treachery. The first is the doing of an act prohibited
by law, while the latter is the commission of a wrong intrinsically
evil. But little distinction can be made between this mode of cheating and obtaining money by false pretence, and it is quite probable
some of the gains in dispute were the product of that crime.
But it is said the complainant is liable, as surviving partner, to
the persons defrauded, for the whole amount fraudulently gained,
that, in such a case, right and liability should be reciprocal. The
general rule may be admitted to be that all the members of a firm
ar, liable for the fraud of one of their number, committed in the
usiness of the partnership, though they in no way participated in
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the wrong, and derived no advantage from it, and though the
frauddoer alone was benefited by the fraud: Gow. on Part.
55; Story on Part., § 108. But that question is not before
the court, and cannot be determined in this suit. And even it the
complainant's liability was clear, that fact would not, at this time,
afford him a right to the judgment he claims. Generally speaking,
wrongdoers cannot ask for contribution, and this rule is just as
applicable to partners as to others: Story on Part., § 220.
Cases may possibly occur where the innocent members of a firm
may in consequence of their association, be required, as to third
persons, to bear losses which, as among themselves, should be
wholly borne by the wrongdoing member. In such a case it
would seem that contribution, or even full indemnity, would be an
act of justice, but it would also seem to be clear that such relief
should not be given on the bare possibility that a loss of that
character may hereafter ensue. Relief in such a case should not
go in advance of harm. The consideration of the question whether
the complainant has a remedy or not, on this ground, may, very
properly, be deferred until he has actually suffered wrong. His
wrongs at present, under this head, are purely anticipatory.
I find nothing in the case which entitles the defendants to an
account from the complainant of the business carried on by him in
connection with other persons than Mr. Rafferty. Such business
was totally dissimilar, in every point of view, from that conducted
by Mr. Rafferty and the complainant, and its prosecution took
nothing from the latter concern to which it was in anywise entitled,
and, so far as can be perceived by any light furnished by the
proofs, its prosecution could not in any way injure or prejudice the
latter concern.
The complainant is entitled to an account of the partnership
dealings, and such account must include all gains lawfully made
by Mr. Rafferty during the term of the partnership, in selling
machinery and machinists' and railroad supplies, whether manufactured by the partnership or by others; and, also, all gains
lawfully made by him in purchasing, for others, machinery and
machinists' and railroad supplies.
A reference will be ordered, in order that an account may be
taken in conformity with the principles herein stated.
One or the questions involved in the
decision of the above case is one gener-

ally considered as of some difficulty,
and upon it the Vice-Chancellor has
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spoken in no faltering accents, but has more guilty party be permitted to retain
given an opinion, such as one delights all the advantage ? Suppose such a
to meet with-a clear declaration that a case-let us Temember that it is from no
court of justice will not lend its aid to tenderness towards the defendant, that,
the carrying out, either directly or indi- even in cases where direct enforcement
rectly, of an illegal contract, or to assist of an illegal contract is sought, the
a party thereto in reaping the fruits court refuses to interfere, but beyond
thereof.
this, does not a partner in the case proThe rule undoubtedly is, that a court posed, come into court with at least
of justice will never lend its aid to the some amount of moral guilt attached to
enforcement of a contract founded on im- him.? He comes into court and demorality or illegality. That this rule mands a share of illegally made profits,
should be so extended that a court will claiming it as his share. Does he not,
refuse its aid in the division of the spoils thereby ratify the acts of his partner and
of such a contract, or in the apportion- declare that, in the very illegal transment of the losses arising therefrom,
action from which the profits arose, his
even though a subsequent contract is partner was acting as his agent? Would
made with reference thereto, seems to us not the course of a high-minded and
a position founded in the highest and honorable man be to refuse to touch
best public policy. It deprives those profits coming by a tainted channel -, to
engaged in illegal contracts of all hope insist on an account of his capital and
that in any way they can have a remedy all legitimate gains only, and refuse
in case their companions in wrongdoing those made by fraud or illegality ? By
behave dishonestly towards them, and suing for them, he would seem to
thus makes all appreciate the full risk make himself, on the well-known
run in an illegal transaction. This maxim, a participant by relation in the
position has, however, been by no means wrong of his comrade. This consideragenerally taken, and many and inge- tion would seem to dispose of the disnious have been the arguments by which tinction at times taken between profits
courts have been justified in becoming from a partnership formed for the purthe dividers of profits arising from ille- pose of carrying on an illegal business,
gal contracts. These arguments seem and profits which arise from an occabased principally on a mistaken desire sional illegal act done by a partnership
to do indirectly what the law will not carrying on a perfectly legitimate busido directly, produce equality amongst ness. Each illegal act should stand and
wrongdoers; as said by Sir ROBERT be considered by itself, and in this re
HENLEY, they see "INo reason why some speet the opinion of the famous council
of the parties, and perhaps the worst, which sat in judgment on Don Quixshould run away with the whole stock otte's books is very sound.
Another distinction often attempted is
and profits, and the court ought to make
them just to one another." Nash v. between dividing the profits of a transaction which is malum in se and one merely
Ash, 1 Eden 378.
It maybesaid the partner claiming an malum prohibitum. Now whatever the
account has frequently been guilty of no distinction between malumn prohibiturn
moral or illegal misconduct; his part- and malum in se is worth, in abstract
ner has used partnership funds in an morals, or in the eyes of a professor of
illegal traffic, and has made money casuistry, its value for the purpose of
legal administration is very slight. In
thereby; the plaintiff has not known of
the transaction until the traffic is over fact, malum prohibitim, from the obligathe profits made; why then should the tion, which for the repose and well be-
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iug of the community, all are under to
obey the constituted law, becomes in
many instances malum in se; and besides,
the commission of an act, malum prohibituti, has equally with the commission of one malum in se a tendency to
beget a disregard of law as law. On
the subject of the relation of the obligations of positive law to ethics, see the
lecture of Judge HARE, before the Law
School of the University of Pennsylvania, delivered at the opening the term
1877-8. 34 Leg. Int. 346.
The present case ignores all the above
distinctions, and holds that the law will
simply drive parties to an illegal contract, and those who endeavor subsequently to participate in illegal gains,
from its judgment-hall, to settle their
differences as best they may. Such,
however, has not been the steady course
of decisions, or even, we may say, the
resultant of the authorities ; indeed, we
find in the books, no case so positive, so
far reaching as the present one ; for even
in Gregory v. Wilson, infra, the court say
that the plaintiff knew that an illegal
rate of interest would be charged, while
in this case the illegal business was carried on clandestinely and concealed from
the plaintiff. A review of the authorities
in England and in. this country, may,
therefore, not be uninteresting. In
Barjeau v. Walmsley, 2 Str. 1249, a
recovery was allowed for money loaned
to play with, and in Nash v. Ash, 1
Eden 878, Sir Robert HENLEY, L. K.,
favored a bill for an account of profits
of a gambling partnership. Iii Holman
v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, Lord MANSFIELD thus explained the policy of the
law in refusing to enforce illegal contracts : "The objection that a contract
is immoral or illegal, as between plaintiff and defendant, sounds at all times
very ill in the mouth of the defendant.
It is not for his sake, however, that the
objection is allowed ; but it is founded
in general principles of policy, which
the defendant has the advantage of, con-
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trary to the real justice, as between him
and the plaintiff, by accident, if I may so
say. The principle of public policy is
this, ex dolo malo non oritur actio. * * *
If from the plaintiff's own showing or
otherwise the cause appears to arise
ex turpi causa, or from the transgressor
of a positive law of this country, there
the courts say he has no right to be
assisted. It is upon that ground the
court goes, not for the sake of the defendant, but because they. will not lend
their aid to such a plaintiff."
The
principle here stated, might well, we
think, have carried his lordship further than it did; for the distinction
taken between enforcing an illegal contract and distributing the proceeds
thereof when completed, rests very
largely on Lord MANSFIELD'S authority. The leading case on this subject is Faikney v. Reynous, 4 Burr.
2069 (1767), which was an action on a
bond. The defendant pleaded that the
plaintiff and one Richardson (co-obligor
with the defendant, as it appears from
a note in 3 T. R. 418), were jointly
concerned in contracts illegal under
the Stock-jobbing Act; that the plaintiff advanced certain money in settlement of differences, and for not performing contracts, &c., and that the bond
was given for the repayment of said advances. The plaintiff demurred. Lord
MANSFIELD took the distinction above
alluded to between things malum prohibituin and malum in se, and also held
the advance of money in payment of
joint losses on the contract stood on a
different basis from the contract itself,
and said "one of these parties had paid
money i'or the other and on his account,
and he gives him his bond to secure the
repayment of it. This is not prohibited.
* * * This is certainly a fair transaction between these two. If money be
lent in order to pay off an usurious contract, or even to lend out upon usury
and a bond be given for securing the
repayment * * * such a bond will not
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be void, the obligor will be bound to
pay it."

This case was followed, and

upon.

This decision was followed in

Brown v. Turner, 7 T. R. 630 (1798).
if anything, the principle carried farther In Brown v. ft1odgson, 6 T. R. 405
in Petricv. Hannay,3 T. R. 418 (1789),
(1795), the King's Bench still carein which money had been paid for losses fully guarding against attacking the
by one of two persons jointly interested authority ofFaikneyv. Reynous and Petin an illegal stock transaction, and con- rie v. Bannay, held that where A., B.
tribution was sought by him from the and C. had become partners in insurother, and the court allowed a recovery ance, illegally, but all the policies were
on the promise of the defendant to con- underwritten by A. alone, he could not
tribute. Lord KEsv.or, however, dis- recover moneys received for the said
sented from the judgment of the ma- policies by his partner C., and an outjority of the King's Bench, and it is to side person, D., as brokers.
be noticed that in a case before him at
In Mitchell v. Gockburne, 2 H. Bl.
nisi prius in the same year, where con- 379 (1794), EYnE, L. C. J., in the
tribution was sought for a loss incurred Common Pleas, distinguished the case
by underwriting in partnership, in vio- before him from the leading cases in
lation of the Act of 6 Geo. 1, he de- the King's Bench, but remarked as to
clined to permit a recovery. The case Failney v. Resinous, " Perhaps it would
of Sullivan v. Grenves, Park. Ins. 8, was have been better if it had been decided
as follows: The plaintiff was an under- otherwise. * * * But be that as it may,
writer, the defendant, a broker; a policy it is sufficient now to say that those cases
was issued bearing the name of the go one step short of the direct illegal
plaintiff only as insurer, but in which transaction, hubt that the present case
one Bristow had agreed to take half of arises immediately out of it." When,
the risk. A loss occurred, the plaintiff however, the question came directly
paid the assured, and Bristow paid his before the Common Pleas, that court
half to the defendant, the broker, who agreed with the King's Bench, and, inheld it. Lord KtwYoN took no notice deed, took very broad ground. In Tenof the doctrine of a distinct contract or ant v. Elliott, I B. & P. 3 (1797), the
obligation to pay money, hut said "the
defendant, a broker, had insured for the
plaintiff is himself the underwriter, who plaintiff, a British subject, goods bound
comes to enforce an illegal transaction ; from Ostend to the East Indies, on
it is a partnership pro huc vice, and this board of a foreign ship, which insurparty cannot apply to a court of justice ance was illegal under the Act of 7
to enforce a contract founded in a breach Geo. 1, c. 21. The goods were lost, and
of the law." Of course as the nisiprius the underwriter paid the money, due
decision of a single judge, this case is upon the loss, to the broker, from whom
hardly authority, but it is of use as the plaintiff sought to recover it. A
showing the dissent of a strong legal recovery was permitted, EYRE, L. C.
J., saying: "The question is, whether
mind from the prevailing doctrine.
In Steers v. Lashley, 6 T. R. 61 he who has received money to another's
(1794), the court took a distinction be- use, on an illegal contract, can be altween money subsequently advanced in lowed to retain it, and that not even at
settlement and a loan in the very transac- the desire of those that paid it to him ?
tion complained of as illegal, and, while I think he can not." Farmerv. Rusnot attacking the foregoing authorities, sell, I B. & P. 296 (1798), is a case of
held that a bill given for differences in considerable interest and seems to go
value of stock in an illegal stock-job- very far. The defendant agreed to carry
bing transaction could not be recovered for the plaintiff certain goods called
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"medals," and to deliver them at Portsmouth to a certain person, receive cash
for them and pay over to the plaintiff.
In fact the "medals" were counterfeit half-pence, intended for circulation
among the sailors. The defendant delivered them, received pay from the
consignee, and accounted to the plaintiff for all but 131., for which the
action was brought. Before ROOKE,
J., at nisiprius, a verdict was given for
the defendant, on the ground of the illegality of the contract ; but the court in
bane granted a new trial. On the argument counsel endeavored to distinguish
between this case and Tenant v. Elliott,
the dealing in counterfeit money being
malum in se. The distinction, however,
was not adopted by the court. EYRE,
L. C. J., said: 1"It seems to me that the
plaintiff's demand arises simply out of
the circumstance of money being put into
the defendant's hands to be delivered to
him. This creates an assumpsit in law.
* * * Though the court will not suffer
a party to demand a sum of money in
order to fulfil an illegal contract, yet
there is no reason why the money in
this case should not be recovered, notwithstanding the original contract was
void." BULLER and HEATH, JJ., regarded the case as ruled by Tenant v.
Elliott. ROOKE, J., in the course of a
strong dissent, said: "I think that a
man who has been guilty of an indictable offence ought not to have the assistance of the law to recover the profits of his crime, and that whether his
agents be innocent or criminal. * * *
If a plaintiff will employ an agent in
such a transaction, he must rely on the
honesty of his agent, and I think the
law ought not to assist him."
In Watts v. Brooks, 3 Ves. 612
(1798), the question came into chancery. An illegal insurance partnership,
in the business of which the policies
were underwritten by one partner only,
was dissolved, and one of the partners
filed a bill for an account ; a decree was

resisted, on the ground that it would be
in furtherance of an illegal transaction ;
but Lord LOUGHBOROUGH said: "Where
the parties have had dealings together
upon a variety of transactions, and losses
have been incurred and paid, and a general account is sought, ]Ldo not execute
the contract against law, but I should
do injustice if I did not give the advantage, if any advantage have arisen, or
charge any loss which has happened.
If it were a smuggling business, and
there had been profit or loss upon a
course of smuggling transactions, I
should do great injustice if I did not
bring that into the account." There was
a decree for a general account. It may,
however, be remarked that the chancellor's dictum, as to the smuggling transaction, was overruled in Thompson v.
Thompson, 7 Ves. 470 (1802). See also
Vand ke v. Hemett, 1 East 6 (1800);
and in Knowles v. Haughton, 11 Yes.
168 (1805), the authority of the case
was much shaken by the disapproval of
Sir WILLIAM GRANT.

In Ex parte Daniels, 14 Yes. 191
(1807), Lord ELDON, C., expressly
disapproved of Faikney v. Reynous, and
Petrie v. Hannay, but no decree was
made, and the case was eventually com
promised. Lord ELDON had previously,
while Chief Justice of the Common
Pleas, doubted the soundness of the t*o
cases just named. In Aubert v. Maze,
2 B. & P. 370 (1801), the plaintiff and
defendant had entered into an illegal
insurance partnership ; the plaintiff paid
losses and sued the defendant for his
proportion thereof. Lord ELDON said :
"It has been said that if one partner in
an illegal partnership pay money for the
other without his authority, the money
cannot be recovered; but if the money
be paid with his authority, it may be
recovered. It seems to me, however,
that if two persons engage in partnership in an illegal concern, each gives
the other an authority to transact all
that business relative to the partnership
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without transacting which no profit can
ever arise from the concern," and speaking of Faikney v. Rteyqnous, and Petrie v.
llannay, " it seems to me that if the
principle of these cases is to be supported the Act of Parliment will be of little
use. HEATH, J., said "I take it to
be by no means settled that if one partner in an illegal concern pay moneys
for the other with his consent the money
so paid can be recovered.

. . . If the

concern in which the money be advanced
be naulum in se, it will not be disputed
that it cannot be recovered.

. . . I

do not see any sound distinction between the case of money paid in a concern which is malum in se and usulum
prohibitum. The latter, as well as the
former, tends to encourage a breach of
the law." It is a little difficult to distinguish this case from some of the foregoing, in which recoveries were allowed,
and had the cause of decision stopped
here, it would perhaps be questionable
law, for Faikney v. Reynous is to be
considered as authority. In the ease of
Sharp v. Taylor, 2 Phillips 801 (1849),
however, Lord COTTEN 1AM recognised
Tenant v. Elliott and Farmerv. Russell
as law, and held that where there has
been a partnership in a business carried
on in violation of a statute, the illegality will not deprive the one partner of
his right to have an account of the gains
of such illegal traffic from the other ; in
the language of the Lord Chancellor,
there is a " difference between enforcing
illegal contracts and asserting title to
money which has arisen from them."
So that on the whole, we may regard
the distinction as firmly established in
England.
In this country, in a very early case,
Conlon v. Anthony's E'rs, 4 Yeates 24,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
showed a strong desire to take advantage of any circumstances to raise a
distinction between an illegal contract
itself and a subsequent one indirectly
connected with it, bat the facts were too

strong to permit the introduction of the
distinction into the case.
The Supreme. Court of the United
States has steadily maintained and acted
upon the distinction between the recovery of money arising from an illegal contract and enforcing the contract itself.
In Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 285
(1826), the facts were substantially as
follows : Goods were shipped to Armstrong and others, and were libelled in
Maine as having been illegally imported ; they were delivered to an agent
of Armstrong on a stipulation being
given to abide the event of the suit, Toler
becoming liable for the appraised value.
Armstrong, on receipt of his goods,
undertook to pay Toler his proportion
of any sum for which Toler might become liable. The goods were condemned. Toler paid the amount of the
stipulation and sued Armstrong for his
proportion thereof. A recovery was
allowed. Here the action of the plaintiff seems to have been entirely untainted by the illegality of the original
transaction, it having been merely an
advance, so to speak, to enable the defendant the better to avail himself of
his legal right, the right to defend his
cause, or his ownership in a court of
justice, by complying with a rule of
law. The case, however, is mentioned,
because Faikney v. Reynous, was cited
therein, and because it has been referred to in a later decision of the Supreme
Court, which is not quite so free from
question. In MBlair v. Gibbes, 17 How.
232 (1854), the plaintiff claimed the
proceeds of a share of a sum of money
received by a company from a contract
with General Minos, for supplies fur.
nished in fitting out an expedition
against Spain. The defendant resisted
on the ground that the share had been
assigned to him. The assignment nad
been held, by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, invalid as in violation of
the Neutrality Act of 1794. The
Supreme Court recognised as law
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Faikney v. Reynous, and Petrie v. Hannay, and cited with approbation Sharp
T. Taylor.
NELJON, J., said, "The
transaction out of which the assignment
arose, was not infected with any illegality. The consideration paid was not
only legal, but meritorious, the relinquishment of a debt * * * the
assignment was subsequent, collateral to
and wholly independent of the illegal
transaction upon which the previous
contract was founded. It may be admitted that even a subsequent collateral
contract, if made in aid and furtherance
of the execution of one infected with
illegality, partakes of its illegality, and
is equally in violation of law, but this
is not this case."
In Brooks v. Martin; 2 Wall. 70
(1863), B., M. and F. entered into a
copartnership; B. by agreement was to
manage the business. B., for the firm,
speculated in soldiers' warrants, contrary to law. M. sued for an account
of the profits and the court decreed an
account. MILxR, J., in his opinion,
relied on Sharpev. Taylor and McBlair
v. Gibbes. CATRos, J., dissented. The
case would seem to go much farther
than the preceding one, and to be
a direct adjudication upon the division of the fruits of an illegal contract;
and in that particular, except as to the
conclusion arrived at, to be scarcely distinguishable from the principal case.
The law in New York would seem to
be the same as is held by the United
States Supreme Court. See the opinion
of CHURCa, C. J., in Woodworth v.
Bennett, 43 X. Y. 273 (1870). See
also Merritt v. Millard, 4 Keyes 38.
. Opposed to the above tendency to, if
possible, ignore the illegal source of
profits, and to distribute them irrespective of how they were made, regarding
them simply as a fund upon which certain persons have a claim, stand the
courts of Virginia and NewJersey.
In Watson v. Pletcher, 7 Gratt. 1
(1850), a bill was filed for the setVOL. XXVIL-62

tleinent of a partnership. The pleadings did not disclose the nature of
the partnership business, but in the
course of taking testimony, it appeared
that the profits thereof arose from
gambling or in keeping a gamblinghouse. BALDWIS, J., said: "It is
clear that a court of equity will not
lend its aid for such a purpose, nor give
relief to either partner against the other
founded upon transactions arising out
of their immoral and unlawful partnership, whether for profit, losses, expenses, contribution br reimbursement.
* ** * There is in the administration
of justice but one rational and politic
treatment of the mutual claims of such
associates, thus springing out of their
spoilations upon society, and that is to
refuse them all aid in the prosecution
of their respective demands against each
other."
In WVatson v. Murray, 7 C. E. Green
257 (1872), a partner in a firm dealing in lottery tickets, filed a bill against
his partner for discovery, the appointment of a receiver, dissolution and distribution of assets. The defendant demurred on the ground of the illegality
of the business. DODD, V. C., said:
"Is the suit one which this court will
entertain ? It seems to me plain that it
is not. Its object is to consummate a
partnership contract entered into and
contracted exclusively for the prosecution of an illegal and mischievous business. * * * * But it was contended
* * * that the court in this case is not
asked to do anything in furtherance of
lotteries, or to enforce an illegal contract, but simply to compel an accounting and distribution of the profits. This
distinction has been taken in authoritative cases." His honor then referred
to Sharp v. Taylor, Blair v. Gibbs and
Brooks v. Martin, and proceeded to distinguish them, hesitating probably from
a natural judicial .Jelicacy to express
his disapproval of them, although the
distinction between the last-named case
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and the one before him seems to us
rather fanciful than real. He said, "In
these cases * * * the partnership was
in no instance formed * * * for a trafficwhich the law made a crime and a
nuisance, the distinction between enforcing the execution of an illegal act
and the distribution of the realized
profits of the act. made use of in those
cases to do justice between the parties
is obviously not to be regarded as one
of universal or general application. It
seems needless to say that it cannot be
invoked to apportion among criminals
the gains resulting from their crimes."
In Gregory v. Wilson, 7 Vroom 315
(1873), two real estate brokers had an
agreement that for any customer furnished by the plaintiff to the defendant,
for whom the latter should procure a
loan, the commissions should be equally
divided. The defendant procured a loan
for such a customer, and received from
him a commission, at a rate above that
allowed by law. The plaintiff brought
action for one-half the said commission.
BEASLEY, C. J., after reviewing the
authorities and stating the distinction
as laid down in Farmer v. Russell, and
eases of that class, said: "Now it appears to me evident that this is extending the rule to the very verge of im*
policy. * *
Nor is the suggestion
made in some of the opinions very reassuring or satisfactory, that in these

cases the transaction alleged to be illegal is completed and closed, and is not
in any manner to be affected by what
the court is asked to do between the
parties, because it is impossible to overlook the circumstance, that if the law
lends its aid to the transmission of the
gains of the misdeed, the doing of the
offence is facilitated for the future.
Until the money, which is the wages
of the'ill-doing, has come into the hands
of the several delinquents, the illegal
transaction, so far as they are concerned, is not closed." While the review
will show the greater number of decisions in favor of the distinction taken,
it seems to us that the sounder and better law is to be found in the New Jersey
case.
As to one other argument in the
principal case, that the plaintiff should
be allowed to recover by way of indemnity against his liability for claim,
which the persons from whom his partner made fraudulent gains might bring
against him, the court well remarks:
"Relief in such a case should not go
in advance of harm." The law would
seem settled that the right to contribution does not exist until actual pay
ment: Cumihings v. Hackley, 8 Johns
202; Maxwell v. Jamison, 2 B. & A
51 ; Tolman v. Smythe, 3 W. N. C.
169 ; Parsons on Partnership 287.
H. BUDD, JR.
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Where a park association offered a purse to be divided into four parts, to be
given to the winning horses, according to their degree of speed, in a race tc De run
under certain regulations imposed by the association, one of which required all
persons desiring to enter horses to compete for the prize, to pay an entrance-fee
equal to ten per cent. on the whole sum to be given ; and defendant entered his
horse to participate in the race for the purpose of winning the purse, and executed
his promissory note to the treasurer of the association for the entrance-fee, but
failing to win the prize, refused to pay the note : Held, that this was not a gaming
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transaction wi bin the meaning of the statute of 1845, declaring void all promises,
notes, bills, &c., made upon a gaming consideration ; that there was nothing
illegal in the transaction, and that defendant was liable upon the note.

from La Salle county.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SIBLEY, J.-The facts argued on in this case are, that the Earlville Park Association offered a purse of $600, divided into four
parts, to be given to the winning horses, according to their degree of
speed, in a three-minutes race, to be run under certain regulations
imposed by the association.
One of its rules required all persons desiring to enter horses to
compete for the prize, to pay an entrance-fee equal to ten per cent.
on the whole sum to be given. Appellee was permitted by the
association to enter his horse, "La Salle," to participate in the race
for the purpose of winning the purse. In consideratiop of that
permission he executed to the treasurer of the association his
promissory note as follows:APPEAL

"$60.00. La Salle, August 18th 1873. Eight months after date,
I promise to pay to the order of Charles M. Smith, Esq., treasurer,
sixty dollars, at his office, value received, with interest at ten per
cent. per annum.
PHILIP CONLIN."
This note was endorsed bona fide to the appellants, before it
became due, for a valuable consideration paid by them. Conlin
having failed to win the prize, or any portion of it, refused to pay
the note. Suit was instituted before a justice of the peace to
recover the amount of it, and the cause taken to the Circuit Court
of La Salle county, where a judgment was rendered in his favor,
from which the appellants appealed to this court. The only question to be determined is, whether the note was taken in violation
of the statute of 1845, then in force, -which reads that "all promises, notes, bills, bonds, covenants, contracts, agreements, judgments, mortgages, or other securities or conveyances, made, given,
granted, drawn, or entered into, or executed by, any person or persons, whatsoever, where the whole or any part of the consideration
thereof shall be for any money, property, or other valuable thing,
won by any gaming or playing at cards, dice or any other game or
games, or by betting on the side or hands of any person gaming, or
for the reimbursing, or paying any money or property, knowingly
lent or advanced at the time and place of such play to any person
so gaming or betting, or that shall during such play, so play or bet,
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shall be void and of no effect." If this was a gaming transaction
within the meaning bf the statute, then the note was void, and the
judgment of the Circuit Court correct.
Gaming is usually defined to be an act done by which something
is hazarded on the event of a contest or issue. The association certainly did not hazard anything by merely receiving an entrancefee. Nor could the simple offer of a premium to the swiftest horse,
be converted into a stake that in anywise depended upon the result
of the race. If so, a prize offered for the finest animal, the handsomest baby, or the greatest production of intellectual effort, would
render the offer liable to the penalties of the statute.
Such a construction must tend to discourage all rivalry in art, in
science, in the products of the soil, and the improvement in the
various breeds known to the animal kingdom. This construction
could not have been intended by the legislature.
To require a fee in advance for the privilege of being admitted to
contest for the prize, is no more a gambling process than the offer
of a prize to the winning party. There is nothing staked upon the
result of a future contingency. The amount to be paid is fixed,
and not in any event to be returned, increased or diminished. The
law does not prohibit the trial of speed any more than the trial of
strength in an animal. Moreover, the person who might pay the
entrance-fee, was under no obligation to engage in the race. How
could the association know his object in procuring a right of entry,
whether it was merely for the purpose of exhibiting the animal on
the ground, or put him to a trial of speed? It simply demanded a
fee before the horse could enter, and left the owner to determine
what course he would afterward pursue. Or even whether he would
avail at all of the privilege purchased, was a matter in which the
association had no concern. On the payment of the entrance-fee,
or the execution of a note taken in lieu of the money, the whole
business was completed, and nothing left depending upon the happening of an event, or the trial of an issue. The prize-money was
to be paid to the successful party, but the amount was certain, and
did not depend at all on the number of entrances. Therefore the
entrance-fee had no direct connection with the payment of the prizemoney. It was decided in Ayplegarth v. Colley, 10 Mees. &
Wels. 728, that a sum of money advanced by a third person as a
premium to encourage horse-racing was not a wager, and the
deposit could be recovered in a suit by the successful party. The
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association in this case was not, in the strict sense of the word, a
party engaged in the racing. It had no horse entered for the purpose, and none was run, or proposed to be run, on its account.
Therefore, being entirely indifferent as to the result, it occupied the
position of a third party to those engaged in running their horses.
It is said in Smith v. Alvord, a case decided by the Marion Superior
Court, Ind., furnished by counsel of appellants, which decision has
since been affirmed by the Supreme Court of that state, not yet
reported,' that "the distinction between the offering a premium by
a third person to the successful one of several contestants, and a bet
between such contestants is obvious. In the former case, the person who offers the premium stakes nothing. In other words, his
liability to pay does not depend upon any contingency. He binds
himself absolutely to pay to one or the other of the contestants
a certain amount, no matter how the contest may be decided.
Although it may be uncertain to whom he will have it to pay; it
is certain he will have it to pay to one or the other. There is
nothing illegal in this, go long as the contest for which the premium
is offered is not in itself unlawful." The case instanced by the
counsel for appellee of the game of keno, where a number of persons each pay into the banker a given sum of money, the amount to
be won back by any of them being dependent upon the vagaries of
the machinery operated by the banker, presents, it is believed
(although we are unacquainted with the game), quite a different case
from the one before us. So, in respect to that of a given number
of persons desiring to organize a horse-race, each one to stake a
certain amount, and if one of them were to execute a note to the
-stakeholder for his stake, could the stakeholder recover in an action
upon the note? It may be answered that if the stake was so placed
for the purpose of being transferred upon the happening of a future
contingency, the arrangement would contain one of the main
ingredients of gaming. Indeed, the very idea of stakeholder
implies one who holds a deposit,. to be disposed of according to the
result of a future occurrence, which doubtless comes within the
provision of the statute. The case of Moher v. Griffen et al., 51
Ill. 184, the only one referred to by appellee as opposed to the view
here expressed, arose on a claim made by the plaintiff for services
rendered in fitting a mare for a race on which money had been bet,
and also board and shoeing of the animal. The court said that
the training of the mare "we suvpome was for the purpose of
I This case will be found in 7 Reporter 396.
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gaming," and yet reversed the cause, for the reason that the court
below refused to allow the plaintiff his claim for board and shoeing; a distinction not less refined than that we have attempted to
draw between the Earlville Park Association in receiving an
entrance-fee, and offering a reward to the successful horse, and a
person betting on the result of the race to be run.
For the reasons indicated, the judgment of the Circuit Court is
reversed and the cause remanded.
Judgment affirmed.
At the common law contracts by way
of gaming or wagering were not, as
such, unlawful: and an act of gaming
not prohibited by statute is not in general indictable: Smith on Contracts
*245 ; Bish. on Stat. Crimes,
846 ; 1
Bish. Crim. Law, 6th ed., 504, 1135 ;
Bell v. rwich, 3 Dy. 254 b.; Case of
Monopolies, 11 Co. 84, 87 b. ; 11West v.
Commonwealth, 3 J. J. Marsh. 641 ; People v. Sergeant, 8 Cow. 139 ; State v.
Cotton, 6 Tex. 425; United States v.
Milburn, 4 Cr. C. C. 719; Reg. v. Ashton, I E. & B. 286.
Some of the state courts, in their decisions upon the subject of wagers, go
so far as to hold that wagers upon the
result of a horse-race are legal, and may
be collected by action at law: Grayson v.
Whatley, 15 La. Ann. 525 ; Dunnan v.
Strother, 1 Tex. 89 ; XcElroy v. Carmichael, 6 Id. 454; Kirkland v. Randon,
8 Id. 10; Barret v. Hampton, 2 Brev.
226. See also, Ross v. Green, 4 Harr.
308; Wheeler v. Friend, 22 Tex. 683.
The contrary view has, however, been
taken in other states, and in many of
the states statutes have been enacted for
the purpose of controlling or prohibiting both racing and wagers. See Wilkinson v. Tousley, 16 Minn. 299; Hasket
v. JWootan, 1 Nott & MeC. 180; Gibbons
v. Gouverneur, 1 Den. 170; Van ValItenburg, v. Torrey, 7 Cowen 252 ; Letois
v. Litthfield, 15 Me. 233 ; Ellis v. Beale,
18 Id. 337 ; Watson v. State, 3 Ind.
123 ; Myers v. State, S Sneed 98 ; Huff
v. State, 2 Swan 279 ; State v. Posey,
1 Humph. 384; State v. Blackburn, 2

Cold. 235 ; McLain v. Hiuffiman, 30
Ark. 428 : McKean v. Caherty, I Hall
300 ; Bledsoe v. Thompson, 6 Rich. Law
44.
Gaming is, in many of the states,
prohibited by statutes more or less stringent in their character, and the question
arises whether a horse-race is a game
within the meaning of these statutes ;
and upon this question the cases will not
be found to be entirely harmonious.
In the State v. Smith, Meigs 99, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee defined
gaming to be "any contest or cause of
action, commenced or prosecuted in consequence of a bet or wager, or with a
view to determine the bet or wager,
upon the event of such contest or action." See also, 11arrison v. The State,
4 Cold. 195, where running a horse-race
on a public road, when there was no bet
or wager, although made substantive
offence by statute, was not considered
gaming.
See also, Bish. on Stat.
Crimes,
857 ; Tatman v. Strader, 23
Ill. 493, as to the meaning of the word,
" gaming. "I
Where "games of chance," "gambling devices," "games of hazard or
skill," &c., are prohibited by statute,
horse-racing, if not specified in the
statute, has been held not to be prohibited by the use of such terms ; Hatless
v. United States, I Morris 169; State v.
Hayden, 31 Mo. 35 ; State v. Rorie, 23
Ark. 726 ; Commonwealth v. Shelton, 8
Gratt. 592. See also Bish. Stat. Crimes,
862, 872, 873.
In Uatless v. United States, supra,
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which was an indictment for betting on
the result of a horse-race, it was held
that horse-racing was not a game of
chance.
In State v. Hayden, supra, which was
an indictment for betting "upon a certain gambling device commonly called
a horse-race," it was held that a horserace was not a gambling device, within
the meaning of the statute, and that
Shropshirev. Glascock, 4 Mo. 536, below
referred to, was not applicable. See
also McElroy v. Carmichael, supf-a, to
the same effect.
In State v. Roie, supra, Rorie and
others were indicted for betting at a
"certain game of hazard commonly
called a horse-race," and the court
were of the opinion that horse-racing
was neither a" game ofhazard or skill,"
within the meaning of the statute prohibiting such games "played,"
&c.,
however vicious betting at such sports
might be.
In Shelton's Case, supra, the defendant was indicted for betting on a horserace, under a statute providing that
"any free person who at any ordinary,
race-field or public place, shall play at
any game whatever, except bowls, chess,
backgammon, draughts, or any licensed
game, or bet on the hands or sides of
others who do play, shall be punished,"
&c.; and it was held that a horse-race
was not playing at a game, so that betting upon the race was a betting on the
hands or sides of others who do play.
Most of the decisions above cited seem
to have been influenced by the peculiar
expressions contained in the statutes
which they construe, and seem to be opposed by other equally well-consIdered
cases.
Horse-racing and foot-racing were
held to be embraced within the statute
of 9 Anne, c. 14, "for the better preventing excessive and deceitful gaming.:,
In gtaxton v. -ye, 2 Wils. 309, which
ws "o action upon a wager upon a
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horse-race, the court said "they ought
to extend the statute of 9 Anne to prevent excessive betting upon all sports as
well as games ; and that althougn horseracing is not mentioned in that statute,
yet it is within the general words other
game or games, as in the case of Gocd-

burn v. Marley, 2 Stra. 1159." But
as observed by ENGLISH, C. J., in
State v. Rorie, supra, it seems that the
statute of 9 Anne was construed in
connection with the preceding statute
of 16 Car. 2, c. 7, in which horseracing, foot-racing, &c., were expres-lv
mentioned (see, also, Lynall v. Longbothaa, 2 Wils. 36, followed by Brown
v. Berkeley, Cowp. 281); so that the
authority of these cases may not perhaps be considered conclusive upon the
question. With reference to this point,
however, C.vox., C. J., in Tatman v.
Strader, 23 Ills. 493, says that "a careful consideration of those decisions will
show that this [the point that the two
statutes were construed together] is
thrown in rather as a make-weight in
the argument than as the basis of the
decisions, and those cases were so decided because the 9 Anne makes all bets
upon games void ;" and he cites Clayton
v. Jennings, 2 W. Black. 706, as overthrowing the argument. Certain it is,
that with the exception of the case of
State v. Rorie, supra, the English cases
above cited seem in all the American
cases considering this question to be regarded as authority for the proposition
that horse-races are games irrespective
of the statute of 16 Car. 2, c. 7.
In Shropshire v. Glascock, 4 Mo. 536
it was held, citing Lyndell v. Longbothom,
and Goodburn v. Marley, supra, that
horse-racing was a game within the
meaning of Rev. Laws of 1825, 409,
(which is copied after the stat. of 9
Anne), enacting "that all promises,
notes, bills, bonds, &c., made or entered into by any person, where the
whole or any part of the consideration
thereof, shall be money, &c.. won by
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gaming, or playing at cards, dice, or
any game or games, shall be void and
of no ecfect."
The action in this case
was upon a bond given to secure a forfeiture in case either party should refuse
to run the race. Shropshire v. Glascock, was followed by Bojnton v. Curle,
4 Mo. 599, which involved precisely the
same point, the note sued on being
given as a forfeiture.
In Ellis v. Beale, 18 'Me. 337, which
was an action to recover hack money
lost at gaming, being a wager of $50
on the result of a trial of speed of plaintiff's and defendant's horses, it was held
that horse-racing or horse-trotting was
a game within the statute of 1821, c. 18,
"to prevent gaming for money or other
property," and that money lost by betting upon the speed of horses in a trotting-match might be recovered back.
Cards and dice were expressly named in
this statute, but not horse or foot-races.
The words " any other game" were,
however, considered sufficiently broad
to embrace horse-racing, which the court
considered within all the mischiefs which
render gaming unlawful. To the same
effect, see Tutman v. Strader, 23 I1.
493, a decision upon the Illinois statute, which is a substantial copy of 9
Anne, c. 14, s. 1. See also, Mosiier v.
Griffin, 51 Ill. 184.
In Cheesum v. State, 8 Blackf. 332, a
horse-race was held to be a game within
sect. 42, p. 993, R. S. 1843, which provides that " any person legally called to
give evidence against another for gaming shall be deemed it competent witness to prove such gaming, although
such person may have been concerned
as a party; and may be compelled to
testify as in the case of other witnesses."
In Wade v. Deming, 9 Ind. 35, which
was an action to recover money bet and
lost on a horse-race, it was held that
betting on a horse-race was betting on a
game within the meaning of sect. 2, R.
S., p. 305, which enacted that money

lost by betting on any game, &c., may,
within six months next following, be
recovered by suit, &c.

STUArT, J., in

this case, said: "The principal point
in this case turns on the word ' game'
as used in the statute. It is insisted
that a horse-race is not a game within
the meaning of that act: I R. S., supra.
The idea of a 'game of horse-race' is
ridiculed, without a just appreciation,
perhaps, of the purpose of all such enactments. It seems obvious that the
same vicious principle runs through all
bets, whether they be upon a horse-race,
or upon cards, or any other undetermined event. It is not the race or the
play that the legislature is aiming at,
but the betting for money or other valuables. In 3 Stark. 1, ABBOTT, C. J.,
says, games, whether of skill or of
chance, are within the English statutes,
and that it is the playing for money
which makes them unlawful. If feats of
skill are games within the statute, feats
of str ngth or of speed must be equally
games within the same statute. Aside
from the awkward phraseology, and regarded on principle only, it is not easy
to distinguish a game of horse-race from
a game of cards, or a bet on the one
from a bet on the other. Both are
clearly within the same mischief."
Notwithstanding nearly all the above
cases cite as authority, or follow cases
which do cite as authority, for the rule
therein adopted, some one or more of
the above-cited English cases, it is
believed that by the weight of American
authority, where "gaming" simply is
prohibited by the statute, and where the
decision is not influenced by peculiar
expressions used in the statute indicating a contrary intent, a horse-race
is a game, within the meaning of the
statutes upon this subject.
A bet or wager, however, as already
stated, seems to constitute an essentns
element of gaming, and a distino
may properly be taken between a
upon the result of a horse-ra
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premium offered by an association or
individual, as in the principal case, for
the purpose of increasing the speed of
tlorses, which is a lawful object. The
purpose of the association being lawful, the fact that third parties bet
upon the result of the race can not, as
it seems, change the result, when the
association offering the prize is not privy
to such betting. See Cain v. McHarry,
2 Bush 263, where RoBERTSON, J.,
says that although a race-course is chartered for the expressed purpose of racing,
yet, while it thus encourages racing, it
does not legalize betting, which is not
necessary for the effectuation of its purpose and is forbidden by the general
law.
The case of .Alvord v. Smith, referred to by the court in the principal case,
and which will be found in 7 Reporter
396, was an action by the appellee
against the appellants to recover a premium offered by them as the Indianapolis Trotting Association, to the owner
of the horse that should make the
second best time in a trotting-match on
the appellant's track. BIDDLE, J.,
delivering the opinion of the court said :
"1Nor do the facts alleged show a wager
or bet. There is a clear distinction between a wager or a bet, and a premium
or reward. In a wager or a bet there
must be two parties, and it is known
before the chance or uncertain event
upon which it is laid, is accomplished,
who the parties are which must either

UniteZ Sates

lose or win. In a premium or reward,
there is but one party until the act or
thing or purpose for which it is offered
has been accomplished. A premium is
a reward or recompense for some act
done; a wager is a stake upon an
uncertain event; in a premium it is
known who is to give before the event ;
in a wager it is not known till after
the event. The two need not be confounded. Nor can we see anything
unlawful or against public policy is such
a case. Under our statutes (1 R. S.
1876, 48) encouraging agriculture and
authorizing public fairs, premiums are
offered for the best draught-horse, trotting-horse, &c. These premiums certainly are not wagers. As well might
an insurance policy be called a wager,
because it is to be paid on an uncertain
event, as to call a premium a wager,
because we do not know who will be
entitled to it, until the event happens.
We can see no difference in principle
between a premium offered by an authorized corporation and one offered by
a partnership. Neither are wagers, nor
are they unlawful."
The case of Alvord v. Smith, and the
principal case, are the only two cases
that have come to the writer's notice
upon the questions directly involved in
those cases, and being clearly correct in
principle will, it is believed, settle the
law upon the point involved.
MARSHALL D. EWELL.
Chicago, July 26th 1879.

ircuit Court, Xastern District of Missouri.

WILLIAM R. GAUSE v. CITY OF CLARKSVILLE.
Whether a municipal corporation possesses the power to borrow money and to
issue negotiable securities therefor, depends upon the construction of its charter
and the legislation of the state applicable to it.
It has no incidental or inherent authority under the usual grants of municipal
powers as a means of discharging its ordinary municipal functions. Such authoritymay be inferred from special and extraordinary powers, which require the
uxpenditure of unusual sums of money, when it is usual to execute such powers
VOL. XXVII.-63
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by means of borrowing, and when upon the whole legislation applicable to the
municipality such appears to have been the legislative intent.
These principles applied, and coupon bonds to borrow money to erect and repair
wharves and to open streets, issued under the general grants of municipal power
in the charter, were held not to be binding upon the city, while other bonds, issued
under a special act of the legislature, in payment of stock in companies organized
to construct macadamized roads from the city, were held to be valid.
Where bonds of a city are issued without authority for money borrowed and
actually received by the city, the remedy against the city is not by an action on the
bonds, but to recover the money.

Tiis was an action by the holder of certain bonds issued by the
defendant city. The defendant demurred to the petition.
Dryden f Dryden and Enoch Pepper, for plaintiff.
Wagner, Dyer J- Emmons, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Circuit Judge.-Three classes of bonds are in ques.
tion, headed and styled respectively, "Wharf Improvement Bonds,"
"Street Improvement Bonds" and "Road Improvement Bonds."
The two first stand on the same, the last on a different ground. The
former will be first considered. The bonds purport to be unconditional obligations of the city, and are negotiable in form. They
do not recite the purpose for which they were issued: this purpose
only appears, if at all, from the heading.
The charter of the city (sect. 13) gives the city council power
"to erect, repair and regulate wharves" and "to open, clear, regulate, graduate or improve the streets of the city." Section 1 creates the city a corporation, and provides that it shall have power to
contract, and to sue and be sued, &c., and "may grant, lease, purchase, receive and hold property, real, personal and mixed, and
may do all other acts as natural persons; and may have a common
seal and alter and break the same at pleasure."
Sect. 12 gives to the council general power to levy taxes on property in the city, but limits such taxes to a rate of one-fourth of
one per cent.
As to the "wharf improvement oonds," the petition alleges that
they were made "for money borrowed by defendant for the purpose
of erecting and repairing wharves in the corporate limits of its city,
and for otherwise improving said city." These bonds are respect.
ively for $2000 and *1000-together $3000.
DILLON,
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As to the "street improvement bonds," it is alleged in the petition that they were executed "for money borrowed by defendant
for the purpose of opening, clearing, graduating, paving and
improving divers streets and alleys in said city, and of otherwise improving said city."
These bonds are respectively for
$1000, $1000, $1500, $400, 8400, $200, $1000 and 8500: total,

86000.
The demurrer to the petition upon the foregoing classes of bonds
is upon the ground that the defendant had no power to borrow
money for the purposes alleged, or to execute the bonds. The
questions to be decided are, therefore, two: 1. Had the city power
to borrow money for the purposes alleged ? 2. If so, whether it
had the power to execute negotiable bonds therefor?
The charter contains no express power to do either, unless it is
conferred by the clause in section one above quoted, that the city
"may do all other acts as natural persons." This general language
must necessarily be restrained to such other acts as are authorized
by.its charter, or the statutes of the state applicable to the city, if
any, and cannot be construed to remove all the limitations inseparable from corporate existence, and to confer upon the city authority to engage in business of a private nature, or to make its powers
commensurate with those of natural persons. It is not, therefore,
an express power to borrow money, or to issue commercial paper.
No such powers are in terms conferred. If they exist, they exist
as incidental to the express powers to erect and repair wharves, and
to open and improve streets, and not otherwise.
As the power to borrow money and the power to issue negotiable
paper are, though closely related, not identical, they will be to
some extent separately considered. And first, as to the power to
borrow money. As the case stands, it is to be taken that the
money evidenced by the bonds now under consideration, was borrowed in advance of any debt incurred in respect of the wharves or
streets, and as a means of raising by their sale in the market a fund
to pay for contemplated improvements of that character. The general question as to the implied power of municipal corporations to
borrow money and to execute negotiable securities therefor, has
been recently much examined. The American cases on the subject
are conflicting, and it is impossible to harmonize them. A careful
examination of them, however, has left us with the conviction that
the questions here involved are not only open to discussion, but
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remain yet to be judicially settled. The unsettled state of the law,
concurring with the great importance of the question, has induced
us to examine it with care, and must be our justification for discussing the subject with more than ordinary fulness.
The following cases favor the existence of the incidental powers
here in question: Bank v. Chillicothe, 7 Ohio, part 2, p. 21 (1836);
Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470 (1860); Williamsport v. Commonwealth, 84 Penn. St. 487-three judges dissenting; Clarke v. School
-District,3 R. I. 169; Sheffield Township v. Andress, 56 Ind. 157.
And see cases collected in notes to sects. 82, 407, Dillon on Munic.
Corp.
The following cases are opposed to the existence of such powers:
Hackettstown v. Swackhamer, 37 N. J. Law 191; Knapp v.
Hoboken, Id. 394; Beaman v. Leake Co. (power of counties),
43 Miss. 237; Police Jury v. Britton (power of counties), 15 Wall.
566, 572; opinion of BRADLEY, J., in Nashville v. Bay, 19 Id.
468.
It is not proposed to examine and review these cases separately.
In the existing uncertainty of the law on this subject, it is better,
perhaps, to discuss the questions upon principle, rather than to risk
our judgment respecting them upon one class of the conflicting
decisions.
Corporations in this country can exist only by virtue of legislative enactment, and it necessarily follows that whether they possess
the power to borrow money "or to make negotiable paper, depends
upon a true construction of their charters and the legislation applicable to them. This is true of all corporations, private as well as
municipal.
An examination of the judicial judgments in England and in
this country shows considerable diversity of opinion between the
English and American courts, as to the extent of the implied powers
of corporations. The English courts have at all times wisely set
a strong face against an elastic construction of corporate charters;
the American courts have too often favored the existence of constructive powers.
In England, if a private corporation wishes power to borrow
money, the power and the purposes for which, and the conditions on
which it may be exercised, are expressed in the charter or constituent acts, or in the memorandum and articles of association; and
the power is not held to exist unless the charter or articles of
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association confer it, or unless the nature of the business for - hich
the corporation is chartered or organized raises a necessary or
reasonable implication of its existence.
But in this couniry it must be admitted that the courts have
held, quite without exception, that all corporations for pecuniary
profit, unless specially restrained, may not only borrow money, but
issue negotiable paper for any corporate debt. Dillon's Munic.
Corp., sects. 82, 407, and cases cited in notes; Lucas v. Pitney,
3 Dutch. (N. J.) 221; Hackettstown v. Swackhamer, 37 N. J. Law
191; per BEASLEY, C. J.
The originals of our municipal institutions are derived from
England, and it is the unquestionable law of that country that
municipal corporations have no power to borrow money unless conferred by statute. Regina v. Litchfield, 4 Ad. & Ellis (N. S.) 891,
906. In the case just cited, it was held that there could be no
recovery upon the note of the corporation given for money borrowed and used to pay the debts of the corporation. PATTESON, J.,
without saying that the lender was obsolutely remediless in any
form of action or suit, did say that he had no remedy upon the
note, because this is "not a trading corporation." In this country
municipal corporations are, by statute, invested with certain defined
powers, and they are almost wholly dependent upon revenues
derived from the authority given to levy taxes for the means of
executing their municipal functions.
In the case before us, the defendant city had, inter alia, the
usual power to erect and repair wharves and to improve streets,
and to make contracts and to incur debts therefor. It had the
power to levy taxes to raise the means to pay debts thus created.
The amount of taxes authorized to be laid in any one year was
limited. it is entirely practicable for the city to execute its ordinary municipal powers and discharge its ordinary municipal duties
without resorting to borrowing money. If in erecting wharves or
improving streets it incurs a general debt, it seems to us plainly to
have been the intention of the legislature, as shown by the charter,
that it should be paid out of its ordinary revenue. It is not necessary to resort to the perilous expedient of borrowing money in
advance, which may be lost, embezzled or misappropriated: much
less to borrow it on a long credit, which inevitably leads to abuse
and extravagance, and issue therefor, as the means of obtaining it,
its negotiable securities. There is an obvious and essential differ-
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ence in incurring a debt to be paid in the usual manner out of the
ordinary revenues of the corporation derived from taxation, and the
raising of money in advance by a pledge of credit and the issue of
coupon bonds payable at a long distant day, for sale in the money
markets of the country.
What are the consequences of holding that there is, under these
circumstances, an implied power to borrow money in this manner and
for this purpose ? The temptation to extravagance and the danger
of loss have been already mentioned, and the history of the workings of our municipal institutions shows that this temptation always
operates to their injury, and that burdensome debts and oppressive
taxation are its natural and almost inevitable results.
But this is not all. Legal consequences of a serious nature
follow from the doctrine that there is an incidental power to borrow
money to execute the ordinary powers of the municipality. If the
power thus to borrow exists, it is without legal limits. Its only
possible limit is the credit of the corporation-the amount of bonds
its officers can sell. Nor is this all. If the power to borrow money
exists, then, under the view of the courts, as almost universally held
in this country, the power to borrow implies the further power to
give, like any other borrower, a note, bill or bond, negotiable in
form and effect for the sum borrowed; the time of payment and
the discount to be such as may be agreed upon between the corporation and the proposed lender. The bonds may, as in the recent
case of the the city of Williamsport, be issued for an enormous
amount, and be sold, as in that instance, for 67 per cent. of their
par value, or even less, and the corporation is bound: Williamsport
v. (ommoitwealth, 84 Penna. St. 487.
Nor is this all. The Supreme Court of the United States has
firmly established the doctrine by a long series of well-known decisions upon municipal bonds, "That when a corporation has power
under any circumstances to issue negotiable securities, the bona
fide holder has the right to presume that they were issued under
the circumstances which gave the requisite authority, and they are
no more to be impeached in the hands of such a holder than any
other commercial paper :" Lexington v. ButZer, 14 Wall. 282.
Such are the mischievous and alarming consequences of the
unsound doctrine, that a municipality has, by virtue of its ordinary
powers and merely as a means of executing its ordinary duties, the
power to pledge its credit by the issue and sale of its commercial
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obligations. It is not the law. No such doctrine can permanently
stand. Although it has taken, as yet, no deep root in our jurisprudence, it has nevertheless attained sufficient development to
"show its noxious character. The general, and, until a period comparatively recent, the universal practice of municipalities not to
issue, without express legislative authority, bonds or commercial
obligations as a means of raising loans, demonstrates the non-existence of an implied power to do this by demonstrating that no such
power is necessary to enable a municipality to execute its usual
powers and to discharge its ordinary duties.
We are required in this case only to determine the inherent or
incidental power of the city to raise loans by a sale of its negotiable securities payable at a distant day. We deny any such power.
Whether all borrowing to meet debts actually incurred, under an
arrangement which contemplates repayment out of the regular revenue, and for which a mere voucher or certificate of indebtedness
is issued is ultra vires, unless the authority is expressly given, we
need not now decide. What we decide on this point is, that the
power to erect wharves and to improve streets, conferred by the
defendant's charter, does not carry with it the power to raise funds
for this purpose by the issue and sale of negotiable securities, like
those here in suit.
Whatever doubt may be considered to exist as to the implied
right to borrow, the want of authority in a municipal corporation
as merely incidental to its usual municipal powers to issue negotiable securities, which shall be invested with all the attributes of commercial paper, seems, on reason and principle, to be plain. Commercial paper had its origin in the conveniences or necessities of
trade among merchants. Originally, only merchants made such
paper; afterwards the making of it was extended to all persons acting in their individual capacity. It extends to trading, commercial
and other partnerships, but if the partnership is not a trading partship, "the question," says 'Mr. Lindley, "whether one partner has
implied authority to bind his copartners by putting the name of the
firm to a negotiable instrument, depends upon whether the business
of the partnership is such that dealings in negotiable instruments
are necessary for its transaction, or are usual in partnerships of the
same description :" 1 Lindley on Part., Eng. ed., 213, 214.
As to the power of corporations to issue commercial paper, the
law of England is settled. In England no corporation, whether
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municipal (Regina v. Litc7ifeld, 4 Ad. & E. 891, 906), or
private (Bateman v. Mid- Iales Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 C.P.
499, 1866), has the incidental right to make commercial paper,
except the Bank of England, which was incorporated for the very
purpose, and trading corporations strictly, such as the East India
Company.
We state the foregoing propositions after a careful examination of the English books. Accordingly, it is laid down by
Mr. Justice BYLES, in his work on Bills, that "without special
authority, expressed or implied, a corporation has no power to make,
endorse or accept bills or notes :" Byles on Bills, 8th Eng. ed., 62.
Thus a water-works company (Broughton v. Manchester Waterworks, 3 B. & Ald. 1), a gas joint-stock company (Brahma v.
Roberts, 3 Bing. N. C. 963), or even trading companies, unless
such a power essential to the purposes for which they are formed
(Bateman v. Railway Co., supra), have no general or implied
authority to make commercial paper. In Bateman's case, just
cited, the question for the first time arose in England, as late as
1866, as to the right of a railway company, with an authorized
capital of 170,0001., to make or accept bills of exchange, and it
was unanimously decided by judges of great eminence (ERLE, C. J.,
BYLES, KEATING and MONTAGUE SMITH, JJ.), that the company
had no such power. The acceptance was under seal, and it is a
mistake to suppose that the decision rested on the technical ground
that a corporation can only contract under seal. It was placed
upon the broad ground that there was no Act of Parliament,
general or special, which conferred the power. It was admitted by
all the judges that the railway company might incur debts in the
construction or operation of the road; "but it is one thing," says
KEATING, J., "to say that they shall be liable to be sued for goods
sold and delivered or for work done, and an entirely different thing
to say that they may accept bills in payment." And to the same
effect was the opinion of the other judges
The principle of this case was approved in The Peruvian, &c.,
Railway Co. v. Thames, &c., Ins. Co., Law Rep. 2 Ch. App. 617,
where a general incidental power to issue bills of exchange and
negotiable instruments under the Companies' Act of 1862 was
denied, and the power held to depend upon the proper construction
of the memorandum and articles of association. The companies
organized under that act may communicate this power to their
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directors, but it must be given expressly or by fair intendment in
the memorandum and articles of association of the company or it
will not exist.
We are aware that the American courts, as to private corporations organized for pecuniary profit, have very generally held a
different doctrine and affirmed their implied or incidental power to
make commercial paper: Dillon Munic. Corp., sects. 81, 82, 407,
and cases cited. But the powers of private corporations in this
regard are not here material.
The American judgments which have affirmed the like power in
municipal corporations have done so upon this course of reasoning.
The corporation, they argue, has power to contract a debt, and it
is assumed to be incident to that power to give a note or bill or
bond in payment of it. Thus in Kelly v. Brooklyn, 4 Hill (N. Y.)
263, CowEN, J., makes the basis of the judgment the erroneous
proposition that independent of any statute provision all corporations, private and municipal, may issue negotiable paper for a debt
contracted in the course of its business; and other courts have
without examination adopted this mistaken view of the law:
Galena v. Corinth, 48 Ill. 423 ; Olarke School -Dist.,3 R. I. 199 ;
Sheffield v. Andress, 56 Ind. 157; Tucker v. _aleigh, 75 N. C.
267; Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356; -Douglasv. Virginia
City, 5 Nev. 147; Sturtevants v. Alton, 3 McLean 393.
It sufficiently appears from the foregoing that it is a mistake to
affirm that the power to issue negotiable paper necessarily or legally
results from the corporate power to create debts.
In England, as shown by Bateman's case, supra, it is held that
in'asmuch as the corporation has no power to accept bills it cannot
be made liable on its acceptance, though the bill was drawn for a
valid and binding debt.
On this point ERLE, C. J., says: "The bill of exchange is a
cause of action, a contract by itself, which binds the acceptor in
the hands of an endorsee for value; and I conceive it would be
altogether contrary to the principles of the law which regulates
such instruments that they should be valid or not, according as the
consideration between the original parties was good or bad, or
whether in the case of a corporation, the consideration in respect
of which the acceptance is given is sufficiently connected with the
purpose for which the acceptors are incorporated. It would be
inconvenient to the last decree if such an inquiry could be gone
VOL. XXVIL-64
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into. Some bills might be given for a consideration which was
valid, as for, work done for the company, and others as a security
for money obtained on loan beyond their borrowing powers. It
would be a pernicious thing to hold that, in respect of the former,
the corporation might be sued by an endorsee, but in respect of
the latter not."
Whether we consider the question in the light of the nature and
objects of the ordinary grants of municipal power, or in the light
of the purposes which led to the invention and which sustain the
use of negotiable paper with the qualities attributed to it by the
law merchant, we are alike led to the conclusion that the mere
power to create a municipal liability for ordinary municipal purposes does not carry with it as an incident the authority to raise
loans by the issue and sale of commercial obligations. The implied
power to issue vouchers or evidences of indebtedness for authorized
and valid municipal debts undoubtedly exists, and it may be true
that such vouchers or evidences of indebtedness, though put in the
form of negotiable paper, are not for that reason void, but if not
void it is clear that they derive no additional force from that circumstance.
The only safe as well as sound doctrine is, that there is no power
in a municipal corporation, as incidental to the execution of its
ordinary duties, to invest its vouchers or notes or bonds with the
character of commercial paper. By statute or usage they may
be transferable, but the transferree always takes instruments thus
issued whatever their form, cztm onere. We are not now referring
to municipal bonds negotiable in form issued by express legislative
authority; these possess, according to the settled law of this
country, all of the incidents of commercial paper.
We have looked closely into the American cases against municipal and public corporations, which hold that it is incidental to the
power to create a debt to give a note or bond in payment of it, bu;
we have found no judgment which holds that the note or bond thus
issued partakes of that quality of commercial paper which protects
an innocent holder for value from defences or equities to which it
would be subject in the hands of the payee. What we wish distinctly to hold is that this supreme and dangerous attribute of commercial paper cannot be imparted to the issues of municipal obligations, whatever their form, unless the power to do so is plainly
conferred, either expressly or by implication by the legislature;
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and that no such implication exists in respect to debts or liabilities
arising from the discharge of ordinary municipal duties.
The argument against the general implied power in municipalities to issue commercial paper with all of the incidents of negotiability may be briefly summarized as follows:
For hundreds of years the original of our municipal corporations
have existed in England, without it ever being contended or held
that they could, without express authority from Parliament, issue
such paper. On the contrary, it is there alike conceded and
decided that such authority is necessary as the basis of the power.
And such has been the view always practised upon in this country,
from the earliest period until a very recent date. The soundness
of this view is strengthened by the almost invariable practice of the
legislature to confer, when it is deemed expedient, upon municipal
and public corporations, in express terms, the power to borrow
money and issue bonds or negotiable securities therefor.
It is a non sequitur, as applied to municipal and public corporations, to affirm that this power to create debts implies the power to,
give a negotiable bill, bond or note therefor, which shall be invested
with all the incidents of negotiability. Such an implied power is
denied in England even as to private corporations organized for
pecuniary profit (other than banking or trading corporations), and
this demonstrates that the alleged implication of such a power in
municipal corporations is neither logically nor legally sound. But
if it be conceded that, as respects private corporations, the American
doctrine is otherwise, and that it is rightly so, still it does not follow
that the same rule does apply or ought to apply to municipal corporations. They are not created for trading, commercial or business
purposes. Private corporations are more vigilant of their interests
than it is possible for municipal corporations to be. The latter are
in their nature governmental agencies, having in general but one
resource with which to meet their liabilities, and that is by taxation, and it is upon this resource that creditors must be taken to
rely. The frauds such a doctrine will enable unscrupulous officers
successfully to practice ought to weigh with decisive force against
its unnecessary judicial entertainment.
It is a power without assignable limits, intrinsically dangerous,
and one which will not fail to prove baneful in the last degree.
Courts, when called upon to establish a new doctrine, ought to conider not only its nature, but its consequence, and cannot properly
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disregard the lessons of experience. A judge may well tremble
when he contemplates in the light of recent experience the disasters
which such a doctrine will bring upon our municipalities when it
shall become generally known that such a tremendous power to
Schuylerize them is lodged in the hands of their temporary officers.
Sound policy and sound legal principles are generally coincident,
and so it is here. If the power to issue negotiable paper is needful
or expedient for our municipalities, let it be given by the legislature, that can prescribe the limits, purposes and conditions of its
exercise, and provide for the payment of the liabilities which are
thus authorized. And, finally, the argument against the existence
of a general implied power in municipalities to issue commercial
paper becomes, as it seems to us, absolutely conclusive, in view of
the rule, wisely settled, that corporate powers, especially powers
whose exercise look to the creation of public burdens, are to be
strictly construed, and that however convenient at times such a
power might be, it is one which is not necessary (as shown by universal experience and practice in England, and generally in this
country) to enable the corporation to exercise its ordinary functions,
or to carry into effect the purposes for which it was created. It is,
therefore, a power which does not exist.
Our justification for this extended discussion is found in the fact
that the doctrine here combatted is struggling for admission into our
jurisprudence. It is one which, as we conceive, is founded in a
radical misconception of sound legal principles, and one, moreover,
whose consequences, if it shall be incorporated into the general law,
cannot be contemplated without anxiety.
It follows that since the defendant city had no power to borrow
money in the manner attempted, to erect the wharf or to improve
the streets, the bonds issued therefor are not legally binding upon
it, and there can be no recovery upon them: Bateman v. MidWales Railway Co., supra; Thomas v. Port Hudson, 27 Mich.
320; Haekettstown v. Swackhamer, 37 N. J. Law 191; Regina
v. Litehfield, 4 Ad. & E. 891, 906; Mayor, &c., v. Ray, 19 Wall.
468, 440, per BRADLEY, J.
It will not validate these bonds so as to make them the basis of
a recovery, even if it be shown that the money borrowed was in
each instance used for the purpose for which it recited in the bonds
to have been borrowed. But the plaintiff may amend and add, in
respect of these bonds, counts in the nature of counts for money
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had and received. Adhering to the decision of this court, TREAT,
J.. in Wood v. Louisiana, at the last term, the present holder of
the bonds will then be treated as the assignee of the original holder
or payee in respect of the money actually lent to the city; and if,
after the city obtained it, the same was in fact expended for the
erection and repair of wharves, or the improvement of streets, or
possibly, if expended for other authorized municipal purposes under
the authority of the city council, the amount advanced, with lawful
interest, less payments received on account thereof, may be recovered: Dillon Munic. Corp., sect. 730; Paul v. Kenosha, 22
Wis. 266; Shirk v. Pulaski County, 4 Dillon 208; Oneida Bank
v. Ontario Bank, 21 N. Y. 490; Iayor, s'c., v. Bay, 19 Wall.
468, 484, per HUNT, J.
The case might be different, even in this aspect of it, if the contract was one expressly prohibited by statute; but this is a question
not unattended with difficulties which it is not necessary to consider.
II. The other class of bonds, known as "road improvement
bonds," were issued in renewal of bonds issued by the city in payment for stock subscribed to certain companies organized to build
gravel roads from the defendant city to points in Missouri. Subscriptions to the stock of such companies were expressly authorized
by the Act of the Legislature of February 24th 1877 (Acts 1857,
p. 302), quoted at large in the statement of the case.
Under the true construction of this act, in view of the general
legislation of the state of Missouri at this period, on the subject of
municipal aid to railway and other companies; the almost universal
practice under such legislation to issue bonds for debts of this kind;
the practical construction put upon this act by the city; the special
nature of the authority given; the limited amount of tax authorized
by the charter to be laid for the ordinary uses of the municipality,
and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States as to
the implication of the power to issue bonds to pay for stocic sunscriptions in railways, and the general tenor of the judgments of the
Supreme Court of the United States on the subject (4nde v.
Winnebago Co., 16 Wall. 6, 12; Polie Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall.
p. 572; Dillon Munic. Corp., sects. 106, 107, 407, and notes);
and that the inference of the power to issue bonds is in no way
inconsistent with the provisions of the act, my judgment is that the
city was authorized to issue bonds in payment for the stock subscribed in those companies; that it would be liable to a general
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judgment on such bonds, and that on those bonds falling due, they
might be renewed by other bonds.
The demurrer to counts one to ten of the petition is sustained,
to counts twelve to seventeen overruled, with leave to amend, if the
'Judgment accordingly.
plaintiff is so advised.
TREAT, J., dissented as to the last class of bonds mentioned,holding them equally invalid with the first.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
ED. S. ROBINSON v. ARIEL HOSKINS.
If an infant buys a chattel and keeps it until he comes of age, and then converts
it to his own use, that is a ratification of the purchase which makes him liable for
the price.
A sale of the chattel after becoming of age is a ratification within this rule.
Such ratification does away with the necessity of any written promise to pay

the debt.

THis was an action for the price of a horse purchased by appellee of appellant in 1875, when appellee was under twenty-one years
of age. He arrived at that age, and sold the horse for $60, for
which he took the note of the purchaser. Appellee relied on two
defences: fraud in selling an unsound for a sound horse, and
infamy at the time of the purchase.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ELLIOTT, J.-If the defence of fraud had been established, the

appellee would have been entitled to have the damage which resulted
therefrom deducted from the price of the horse.
If the plea of infancy were sustained, that defence was a bar to
the action, unless the appellee converted the horse or kept it and
used it as his own property after he arrived at age.
In Tyler on Infancy and Coverture 82, it is asserted that
"where an infant purchased a horse, and gave his note for the purchase-money, and kept the horse until after he was of age, and then
sold him, this was regarded as a ratification of the purchase, and
the infant was held liable on his note. So, if an infant buy goods
on credit, and has them in his possession, and uses them, and does
not return them to the vendor within a reasonable time after he
comes of age, it has been held that he thereby ratifies the purchase,
and becomes liable for the price of the goods. So, where an infant
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purchased a yoke of oxen, for which he gave his negotiable promissory note. After he became of age he disposed of the oxen and
received the avails. This was held a ratification of the purchase,
and the infant was made liable to pay his note.
It is true that the plaintiff cannot sue upon the defendant's
promise, made after he was of age, to pay the debt incurred during
infancy, unless such promise is evidenced by a writing, but if the
purchase is made during infancy, and the thing purchased has been
kept and used by the infant till his arrival at age, and then converted to his own use, such conduct amounts to an election by the
adult to stand by the contract made whilst he was an infant.
The reasoning upon which this doctrine rests is that the contract
of the infant is not void, like that of a feme covert, but is only voidable, and having used, sold and converted, after his arrival at age,
the property purchased during his infancy, he has, in contemplation of law, elected, when an adult, to keep the property at the
price and on the terms agreed on when he was an infant.
The evidence in this case conduces to prove that after his purchase of the horse the appellee sold it, and took the purchaser's
promissory note for $60, as the purchase price, which note was still
in the appellee's possession and unpaid in October 1877, and these
facts were substantially set up in plaintiff's reply, to which a
demurrer was sustained. The reply alleged that the appellee
became of age in Jauuary 1876, and sold and converted the horse
by receiving the purchaser's promissory note for it.
If, after his arrival at age, the appellee sold and converted the
horse, his conduct amounted to a confirmation of the original
agreement, and needed no written promise to support it, and,
therefore, the court erred in sustaining appellee's demurrer to
appellant's reply.
Wherefore the judgment is reversed, and cause remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.
JAMES RIVES

ET AL.

v. N. L. THOMAS

ET AL.

A person who endorses a past due note at the request of the maker, pursuant to
a contract with the payee for further indulgence, is liable as guarantor.

THIS was a bill filed to hold the defendant liable as surety or
guarantor of the payment of a note, and to subject to the satisfac-
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tion of the same certain property conveyed by him to his son witbout consideration.
The following facts appeared: On 14th February 1859, the
defendant, J. J. Thomas, executed his note under seal to the testator of the complainants, payable one day after date. On Febraary 1871, one of the complainants called upon the said Thomas for
payment of the note, when the latter proposed if complainants
would wait upon him to give his brother, the defendant, N. L.
Thomas, as security upon the note. They therefore went together
to the residence of N. L. Thomas, and the said N. L. Thomas, at
the request of J. J. Thomas, wrote his name on the back of the
note.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The testimony leaves no doubt that the object
of the visit of complainant and J. J. Thomas to the defendant,
the obtaining of additional security on the note in consideration
of forbearance of suit, was explained by the debtor to his brother
before the signature of the latter was endorsed, and that the
endorsing brother knew he was assuming and intended thereby to
assume whatever responsibility the act created. The complainant
did forbear to sue for about a year, the maker of the note in the
meantime becoming inso lvent. No demand of payment of the
note was made of the maker subsequent to the endorsement, nor,
of course, was any notice of non-payment given to the defendant,
N. L. Thomas. The words, "I guarantee the payment of the
within note," was afterwards written at the instance of the complainants, and by their counsel over his name 4s endorsed.
It is not denied that an agreement to forbear suit for an indefinite time, which would mean a reasonable time, or an actual forbearance, would constitute a sufficient consideration to sustain a
promise to guarantee the payment of a note: Tappan v. Campbell,
9 Yerg. 436; Johnson v. Wilmouth, 13 Met. 416; Story's Prom.
Notes, § 186. And the evidence shows due diligence by the complainants to collect their debt from the maker, and that the latter
became insolvent before the expiration of the reasonable time of
forbearance, if these facts are at all important in determining the
rights of the parties.
Something was said in argument upon the point whether parol
testimony was.admissible to show the contract between the parties.
COOPER,
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But the decisions of this state in accord with the weight of
authority in other states, are, that as between the immediate parties, parol evidence is admissible to show the actual agreement upon
which an endorsement of negotiable paper is made, and that the
endorsement may be filled up accordingly: Comparee v. Brockway,
11 Hum. 260; Iser v. Cohen, 1 Bax. 421; 2 Daniel Neg. Instr.,
§ 710, 1765; Story's Prom. Notes, § 459; Bey v. Simpson, 22
How. 341. And when the promise has arisen out of some new
consideration of benefit or harm moving between the new contracting parties, it is not within the Statute of Frauds: Hall v. Rodgers,
7 Hum. 536; Story's Prom. Notes § 437. The note under consideration is negotiable under our Statute Code, § 1957. The contest is
therefore narrowed down to the liability incurred by the endorsement, either implied by law or shown by the proof.
The decisions on the presumptive status of an irregular endorser
of a negotiable note, in the absence of any evidence whatever of
intent or contract, are irreconcilably in conflict. When nothing
appears but the instrument itself bearing the name of a third person
as endorser before the name of payee, and the suit is by the endorsee for value before maturity, some courts treat such third
persons as a joint-maker; some as a surety or guarantor in the
sense of joint-maker; some as secondarily liable as a guarantor;
and some as a second endorser: 1 Daniel Neg. Instr., § 713. The
weight of authority is, perhaps, at this time in favor of considering
him in such case as a second endorser. For the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts, with which court the doctrine of holding such
endorser as a co-maker originated, afterwards conceded that, if
the point were new, he should be treated by third parties simply
as a second endorser, leaving the payee and himself to settle their
respective liabilities according to their own agreement: Union
Bank v. Willis, 8 Met. 504.
Between the payee and such endorser, the weight of authority,
as we have seen, is, that parol proof of the facts and circumstances
which took place at the time of the transaction and of the intention
and agreement is admissible (1 Daniel Neg. Instr., § 711); and such
is the settled doctrine of this state, while in the absence of such
proof, our courts have adopted the rule that the irregular endorser
is to be treated only as a second endorser: Comparee v. Brockway,
11 Hum. 355; Clouston v. Barbiere, 4 Sneed 336; Brinkley v.
Boyd, 9 Heisk. 149; Iser v. Cohen, 1 Bax. 421. In the last of
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these cases, which was a suit by the payee of a note against the
endorser, it was accordingly held that an endorser may, by agreement, enlarge his liability, and that it is competent upon the trial
to show by parol evidence the nature and extent of his undertaking.
The endorsement sued on was made before the delivery of the
note to the payee for the accommodation of the maker, and the evidence disclosed the fact that when the payee objected to the form
of the paper, the endorser said it was the same thing as if he had
signed his name on the face of the note, and he was held liable as a
co-maker.
The principles of our decisions are unquestionably sound, though
there may be some doubt as to the correctness of its application to
the facts of one or two of the cases. In Brinkley v. Boyd, 9 Heisk.
149, there was nothing to rebut the legal presumption that the
defendant intended to become a second endorser. "The proof
does not show," says the eminent judge who delivered the opinion
of the court, "any understanding, intention or agreement on the
part of Brinkley as to the nature of the liability assumed by him
in said endorsement."
To the extent of the actual ruling on the facts, the decision is
sustained by the general principle, although the payee of the note
may have had reason to suppose, from the nature of the transaction, that the defendant intended to assume a higher grade of
responsibility, or, at any rate, a responsibility to him. For it may
be that the defendant was induced to endorse the note for the
accommodation of the maker, under the assurance that he was to be
second and not first endorser.
As between, the payee and endorser, whatever may be the rights
of innocent third parties, the former may well be required to show
that the latter can only be made liable to him by agreement, either
express or fairly implied from the conversation between them, or
the facts and circumstances shown in proof.
In Comparee v. Brockway, 11 Hum. 355, it does not appear
that the payee had ever had any interview with the defendant,
whom he was suing as endorser, nor that the witness examined
was present when the endorsement was made. The witness proved
that the defendant agreed to endorse the note as accommodationendorser of the maker for the payee's benefit. It does not appear
that the liability of the defendant as endorser was fixed by demand
and notice, and it does appear that the blank endorsement was

RIVES v. THOMAS.

filled up by plaintiff's counsel, by writing above it "For value
received, I promise the payment of this note to R. N. Brockway."
The opinion of the court was delivered by Judge IcKINNEY, one
of the most logical reasoners and accurate thinkers of the judges
who have presided in this court. The logic of his argument is,
that there is no sufficient proof to sustain the endorsement as filled
up, that the endorsement is consequently a blank endorsement, and
the defendant might have been charged as endorser. The mode he
suggests by which the defendant might have been charged as
endorser is, that the payee could have endorsed the note, thus
making it negotiable and putting it into circulation, and at the
same time taking care to restrict his own liability. This suggestion is apparently sanctioned by the reasoning of the chancellor in
the Court of Errors of New York, in Hall v. Newcomb, 7 Hill
416. But there is a good deal of point in Senator Bockee's reply
in that case to the suggestion, that "this sort of finesse and
shuffling game is below the dignity of the law." And the point has
been directly ruled otherwise, upon a similar case to the one Judge
McKINNEY thought he had before him, namely: a blank endorsement without more before delivery to the payee, in Phelps v. Fischer,
50 N. Y. 69. Seeing the narrowness of his standing-ground, Judge
McKINNEY, with commendable caution, concluded his opinion thus:
"We go no further than to hold that a blank endorsement in a case
like the present creates no other liability than that of an ordinary
commercial endorsement, and that the endorser, in the absence of
countervailing proof, cannot be held bound in any other or different
form." In this, then, the decision is in accord with the general
principles recognised.
In Clousten v. Barbiere,4 Sneed 836, the suit was by the payee
against the endorser as a joint prlomisor with the maker. A witness proved that the note was given for land sold by the payee to
the maker; that the defendant, in the presence of the payee, agreed
to go the maker's security, and upon this consideration the payee
agreed to give up any lien on the property sold. The witness was,
however, not present when the notes were given. The learned
judge who delivered the opinion of the court in this case, holds that
the word "security" might apply as well to an endorsement as
to a liability as co-maker of the note, and as the defendant did
become endorser instead of surety on the face of the paper, he must
be treated as an endorser. This case, he says, "can only be
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regarded as a blank endorsement of commercial paper, and as such
could only be filled up with a general endorsement, leaving to the
endorser all the advantages and liabilities incident to that character and none other or different." Conceding the correctness of
this conclusion, the decision was also in accord with the principles
recognised by our courts.
I am free to say that while conceding the correctness of the law
as announced in these opinions, I think it was wrongly applied to
the facts of these cases. There was eVidence in both of them to
show knowledge on the part of the endorsers of the facts of the
case, and an intention on their part to become directly bound to
the payees for the price of the consideration received by the makers
of the notes on the faith of the endorsement. If they could not be
held liable as endorsers, and it is conceded in the first case that it
could only be done by indirection, what Senator Bockee styles a
"sort of finesse and shuffling game," and it seems to be taken for
granted in the last case that it could not be done at all, then upon
the universally recognised maxim "ut res magis valeat quam pereat"
they ought to have been held as guarantors or co-makers. At any
rate, there was enough evidence in both cases to have gone to the
jury upon the question of intent, and their verdict would doubtless
have been, as it was on the first trial in the Brockway case, in favor
of the plaintiffs.
The case before us differs from all those cases we have been considering in two respects. In the first place, the endorsement was
made after the maturity of the note, and therefore the presumption
of the law arising from a blank endorsement at the inception of
negotiable paper does not arise. In the second place, the endorsement was made in the presence of the personal representative of the
payee, upon a new consideration then passing, and under such circumstances as to demonstrate that the endorser intended to become
bound directly to the payee. In his masterly summary of the liabilities created by irregular endorsements, Mr. Justice CLIFFORD
says, "that if the endorsement be subsequent to the making of the
note at the request of the maker, pursuant to a contract with the
payee for further indulgence, the endorser is liable as guarantor:
Bey v. Simpson, 22 How. 341. In Vermont the courts hold the
endorser liable as co-maker; Strong v. Ricker, 16 Vt. 564. All
the other cases which I have been able to find, treat such an
endorser as a guarantor: Trist v. Cutter, 31 Me. 536: Tenny v.

